Between 1974 and the implementation of the WTO Safeguards Agreement in 1995, a total of 63 Section 201 petitions were filed. A little more than half of those petitions led to affirmative injury findings by the Commission. The President declined to take any action in more than half of those affirmative findings. Only nine cases resulted in direct trade action within the contemplation of Article XIX. Four other cases led to orderly marketing arrangements or VERS outside the scope of Article XIX. As demonstrated by the numbers, the chance of a domestic industry achieving import relief under Section 201 during the period was a relatively slim one in five, or considerably lower than the success rate under United States anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws.

Since implementation of the WTO Safeguards Agreement, however, domestic industries have achieved a decidedly improved success rate, securing import relief in several cases. Any number of factors may have played a role in this development. Certainly, changing political attitudes on trade, the make-up of the Commission, and the willingness of the White House to grant import relief during this period are among the most important. Another important factor, however, is the prohibition on grey measures imposed by the Safeguards Agreement. By eliminating grey measures as a political outlet and forcing governments to work within the confines of Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement, the standards for determining the need for import relief, both qualitative and political, may have been adjusted down to accommodate the new environment. Whatever the reason, a law that was once rarely employed because of the limited chance of securing import relief is now finding new popularity.

Source: Business Guide to Trade Remedies in the United States: Anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguards legislation practices and procedures